HONOUR IN TRANSITION
Changing gender norms among the Rohingya

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Aarar Dilor Hota (Voices of Our Hearts) is a series of publications based on consultations conducted by the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Communicating with Communities (CwC) team in the Site Management and Site Development Unit at IOM Cox’s Bazar. The objective of these consultations is to provide and build a better understanding of the thoughts, practices, traditions, culture, values and perspectives of the Rohingya community as a group of people with different ways of thinking, feeling and behaving. These works are supported by relevant insights and research on the Rohingya population in Myanmar, Bangladesh and other contexts. For further information, please contact IOM’s CwC team. This consultation paper has been produced in collaboration with United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and IOM.
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UN Women, grounded in the vision of equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, works for the elimination of discrimination against women and girls; the empowerment of women; and the achievement of equality between women and men as partners and beneficiaries of development, human rights, humanitarian action and peace and security.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>burka</td>
<td>an enveloping outer garment which covers the body and the face that is worn by women in some Islamic traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp-in-Charge (CiC)</td>
<td>camp administrator appointed by the Government of Bangladesh a revivalist movement within Sunni, (primarily Hanafi), Islam that began during British Colonialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>djinn</td>
<td>an invisible spirit mentioned in the Koran and believed by Muslims to inhabit the earth and influence mankind by appearing in the form of humans or animals</td>
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<tr>
<td>elom</td>
<td>wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elomdar</td>
<td>person with wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gunah</td>
<td>sin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hadith</td>
<td>Hadith is a series of texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imam</td>
<td>the man who leads prayers in a mosque; for Shiites an imam is a recognized authority on Islamic theology and law and a spiritual guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>izzot</td>
<td>Honour, social reputation, sexual reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>izzotdar</td>
<td>Person with izzot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madrassa</td>
<td>an Islamic school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majhis</td>
<td>A Rohingya man appointed as a camp representative by government officials to support the CiCs, army and police in maintaining control and order, and act as focal points for humanitarian relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mahr</td>
<td>a payment, in the form of money or possessions paid by the groom, to the bride at the time of Islamic marriage. Mahr is typically specified in the marriage contract signed during a marriage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muezzin</td>
<td>the official who proclaims the call to prayer on Friday for the public worship and the call to the daily prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>murrobhi</td>
<td>a respected person, who can take decisions and be a leader for the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>purdah</td>
<td>a practice of female seclusion prevalent among some Muslim and Hindu communities. It takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes and the requirement that women cover their bodies so as to cover their skin and conceal their form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shomaz</td>
<td>Rohingya community units, literally “community” or “community committee”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabligh Jamaat</td>
<td>an Islamic missionary movement that arose from Deobandi philosophy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Humanitarian crises often exacerbate pre-existing gender inequalities and discriminations, which lead to different and often disproportionate risks, vulnerabilities and impacts on women and girls. Yet, these crises can disrupt gender inequalities and result in shifts in power relations. There has been a growing interest in social norms within development and humanitarian work in recent years, highlighting the importance of better understanding the impact of these norms on achieving various outcomes and on their usefulness as a potential site for development and humanitarian interventions. The transformative change processes of gender and social norms are therefore a key aspect, often overlooked, that contributes to human rights-based and effective humanitarian action. This paper seeks to map gendered social norms in the Rohingya refugee response in order to better inform future programming of the humanitarian community in Cox’s Bazar.

With respect to gender equality and empowerment of women and girls, social and gender norms shape the realities, behaviours and lives of all Rohingya. Due to the lack of in-depth research on Rohingya culture as well as contemporary events that have affected socio-cultural dynamics, there is a poor understanding of how displacement, the context of the camps, and the current aid relief mechanisms are influencing their rapidly changing social landscape. The previous paper (January 2020) highlighted the rapid changes that their social structures underwent during the displacement process and the shift in the underlying norms and practices of these communal groups. However, it largely failed to explore how these events also impacted on gender norms related to women and girls.

The gendered nature of the Rohingya refugee crisis is notable because of the high prevalence of gender-based violence against women and men, and the socially restrictive norms that limit women’s access to all public spheres. There is potential for better social norms and gender equality programming to address some of these issues. However, whether displacement and programming within the response is disrupting or reinforcing various practices, inequalities and beliefs, as well as the extent to which this may do so are complicated questions whose answers are ambiguous and varied.

1 Smith (2019); Leider (2013).
As the Rohingya refugee response protracts, it is more important to consider the impact that the displacement is having on social norms, which shift and change over much longer timeframes due to a wider range of influences and dynamics. Hence, this paper provides a critical insight into the ways in which social norms predominantly related to women and girls are questioned, change or remain the same. It also addresses a persistent failure to better engage Rohingya in programme design, especially with respect to gender mainstreaming of humanitarian programmes, women and girls’ empowerment programmes, and gender-transformative work regarding social norms. Yet, given the lack of documented exploration of the cultural, economic and political dynamics, both contemporary and historical, that are influencing Rohingya women and girls’ access to opportunities and spaces, the findings here do not present a complete picture of the issue. Unsurprisingly, it was observed that Rohingya women and girls are bearing the brunt of scrutiny in relation to social norms. In addition, the level of influence and control social norms have in the camps in Bangladesh are contested by Rohingya men and the women themselves, as well as humanitarian workers in ways that often lead to social backlash instead of progressive transformation over time.

Humanitarians are often aware that their programmes and interventions are within sector-based interventions and siloed programming that fail to take into account how the interventions are experienced in intrinsically interlinked dynamics within local frameworks that responders are largely unaware of and not engaged in. Affected populations do not experience the world or their problems in needs-based silos, especially with regard to multifaceted and cross-cutting issues like women’s empowerment, protection, access to services, paid work, education and leadership. Consider that interventions with the objective to “empower women” through changing norms related to gender based violence are occurring alongside work that encourages women’s participation in paid volunteer or cash for work programmes, work that encourages women’s presence in gender-mixed committees, and expectations for women to engage in distribution related activities. These works are being designed, implemented and discussed in independent spheres, but their impact is experienced simultaneously on affected communities in uneven ways with an unclear overall impact. Thus, this paper provides an overview of the impacts of these various influences on normative environments and values that govern and control the actions and lives of women and girls.

As part of this critical exploration of social norms, this paper first discusses established theories and frameworks of social norms interventions used to understand how social norms interact and intersect with other institutional structures, material incentives and individual attitudes. It will then present izzot (or honor), as the principal social norm governing women’s actions and discuss how understandings of izzot are inherently gendered for the Rohingya. The paper then explores women’s practice of purdah (seclusion of women from public observation), its implications, and its significance for Rohingya as an identity marker after the genocide. This is then discussed in relation to Deobandi Islamic philosophy and shared mutual support for women’s education in secular and non-secular education. Here, the importance of religious education in reinterpreting social norms is examined together with how these interpretations can impact women’s security and access to opportunities. The paper will then explore various institutional dynamics within the response that shape and govern women’s marriage, divorce and family formations, and how these dynamics are increasingly applied without the Rohingya’s control or agreement with these practices. Dowry related practices and women’s engagement in paid work are then discussed as the primary intersections between material incentives and understandings of izzot. Finally, the paper concludes with key reflections for social norms practitioners and humanitarians working in response interventions in Cox’s Bazar and a set of guiding questions that can be used by programmers to better develop and improve their programmes with respect to sensitivity surrounding social norms.
KEY FINDINGS

Social norms are heavily influenced by individual attitudes, institutional practices, including religious rules and governing institutions, material incentives, and humanitarian programmes. It is important to understand where social norms are inter-related to these various dynamics and what impact they have on various groups. These intersections are not only important spaces through which to transform norms, but also points of contention to be considered at length.

The Rohingya's understanding of izzot, or “honour” has specific implications for women and operates as a normative system of control that shape their status and roles within their families and communities. Izzot represents a critical intersection of gender and power through which social reputations and actions are assessed, governed and punished for non-compliance. A woman's honour is something that is carefully policed, assessed and evaluated through complex trade-offs that a woman makes between upholding traditional values, Rohingya identity and her engagement in “less acceptable” non-normative activities.

Social perceptions of women's “honour” are transitioning in the camps due to the displacement and camp context. Because of the displacement many Rohingya have been unable to practice the same social norms, traditions and practices as before. Women are now regularly required to engage in many new activities, such as fetching water outside home compounds, going to distribution centres, and participating in meetings alongside men. This, together with new opportunities and incentives for women, is changing the perceptions of what constitutes an “honourable woman” but often in highly contentious ways where these changes are perceived as being forced. This has and is contributing towards backlash.

The tradition of purdah begins with menstruation and is the predominant practice of regulating honour. Understanding of the practice is varied and can permit or inhibit access to spaces and opportunities outside of a woman's home. Socio-cultural norms surrounding menstruation and the meaning of purdah should be further explored and are a potential site for transformation. After beginning menstruation, the interpretation of purdah governs how a woman behaves and where she can go. Opening communal discussions on the extent to which new “purdah boundaries” have formed within the camps would be a promising way to transform these norms and redefine their meaning in this new context.

Rohingya women and men police practices of purdah as a way to affirm Rohingya collective identity. Many Rohingya believe returning to traditional religious values, social norms and practices is important after the attempted genocide; However, this predominantly impacts Rohingya women and their opportunities for empowerment. The conflict and feeling of having their ethnicity attacked, as well as the gendered nature of the violence that occurred during displacement, has meant that women's bodies and behaviours are increasingly scrutinized and associated with “Rohingya identity.” Hence, the feeling of “losing control of women” is related to experiences of “losing control” over Rohingya identity.

Returning to traditional, religious values has been a historical means of responding to attacks on Islamic identity in South Asia. As a result, interpretation of religious texts by women and men have a tremendous impact on what women are allowed to do and how they are treated. Women and men rely heavily on the hadith and religious institutional norms to determine the acceptability of women's actions and their impact on honour. Women's participation in these

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2 A collection of traditions containing sayings of the prophet Muhammad, which, with accounts of his daily practice (the Sunna), constitute the major source of guidance for Muslims apart from the Koran.
discussions has resulted in better outcomes for their access to public spheres. However, women and men both participate in enforcing these norms, and the broader consequences of women's engagement in religious spaces are unclear.

Regardless, the religious and secular education and literacy of Rohingya women is supported by many men and women and clearly enables these women to negotiate better terms for themselves and others within society. Providing Rohingya women with education opportunities that include both religious and secular education, life skills, and other training was socially acceptable and encouraged by many men and women. Most men wanted their wives to obtain ‘wisdom’ through literacy in Arabic, English and Burmese. Further non-formal education was acceptable if it occurred in gender-segregated settings and did not encourage non-Islamic activities. Women’s literacy and education are clearly critical spaces for further development and transformative potential that does not exacerbate existing expectations of women or create backlash.

Registration practices are influencing the practice of marriage, divorce and family formations in unclear ways that need to be explored further. These dynamics exacerbate fathers’ and husbands’ feeling that their daughters and wives are “outside of their control” and may be ineffective at substantively transforming norms related to honour. Payment for services related to registration and the need to forge or lie about age on identity documents in order to seek permission for early and child marriages have an unclear impact on the refugees. It is possible that these institutional practices may drive or fuel the need to find other ways to marry, such as trafficking of women and girls for arranged marriage.

Honour has a clear price, and demographic disparities have driven the creation of large demands for dowry payments and divorce, and have led families to adopt negative coping mechanisms of early and child marriage, trafficking for arranged marriage, indebtedness and polygamy. Because there is a disproportionate ratio between young women and men with a higher number of women, dowry paid to men’s families has become a common practice, and women are unable to find or pay for marriages in the camps. Many families reported distress and anxiety over younger, unmarried daughters in their families. For Rohingya families, the space between their daughter’s menstruation and her marriage is a difficult and precarious time where the potential to harm or threaten her families’ collective izzot in addition to her own is at the greatest. Furthermore, this has led families to adopt a range of coping strategies that harm their daughters and their families’ well-being.

Financial challenges are increasingly leading women to engage in “unacceptable” work that threatens their honour. Women are engaged in humanitarian activities in ways that often require them to compromise their honour and potentially result in further policing, harassment and shaming by men and women. These ways include requiring women to stand in distribution lines alongside men or participating in cash-for-work programmes that require them to perform non-traditional or masculine forms of work in the public sphere with men. There was a strong, expressed need for more gender-segregated spaces and activities to enable Rohingya women’s adherence to purdah and to not risk harming or undermining women’s izzot.

Yet, many women appreciate having work opportunities and would like to engage in them more if they weren’t required to compromise their honour to do so. Some women reported that having opportunities to earn income was a way for them to negotiate permission and acceptance from husbands, family members, community leaders and imams to engage in activities in public spaces and women centres outside their homes.
This paper is a result of a collaboration between various staff of IOM Communicating with Communities (CcW) and Protection Units, and UN Women in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Information and analysis here is based on information gathered through dedicated inquiries and consultations with Rohingya men and women, as well as discussions with staff and informants in humanitarian programming within the response. A total of 27 dedicated focus group discussions and ten key informant interviews were conducted with Rohingya men and women of various backgrounds from across ten camps (3, 4, 4 Extension, 5, 18, 20 Extension, 23, 24, Kutupalong Registered Camp, Kutupalong Hindu Camp). Camps were chosen based on a range of factors to ensure a diversity of respondents, including according to their differing access to services and arrival dates. Discussions in the Rohingya community were carried out among female household heads, adult women, women volunteers, adolescent girls and boys, elected women community representatives and committee members, female and male majhis, women and men engaged in skills training and cash-for-work programmes, young fathers, mams, male and female teachers, mosque committee members, widows, older men and women, self-organized women leaders, women with better education, and women with disabilities. As much as possible, discussion were first recorded and transcribed, and later recorded through detailed note-taking and simultaneous interpretation due to time constraints.

To complement these consultations, this work brings to bear two fields of literature that are helpful in improving understandings of the social norms dynamics within the response with respect to Rohingya men and women: relevant academic literature on South Asian social norms and value systems, and relevant theories on social norms interventions. While the work began explicitly as an exploration of social norms, it was observed that there were “other factors” impacting experiences and rules surrounding social norms; namely, material incentives, institutional policies and individual attitudes that were shaping women’s reality and capacity to engage in different spaces. As a result, a “dynamic framework” proposed by Cislaghi and Heisse was adopted as the basis for this study’s analytical approach to the exploration of different variables that impact upon central questions of gender and power. This framework is suggested to other practitioners within the response as an easy way to approach and understand the different ways of impacting a Rohingya woman’s izzot, or honour.

Finally, it is important to point out that, although this paper aims to provide an objective, apolitical and holistic overview of the various social norms that impact gender dynamics in the camps, it does not endorse the norms presented that disempower women and girls. The purpose of the paper is to enhance the understanding of social norms among humanitarian practitioners in order to design better programmes and interventions to enable the effective empowerment of women and girls according their own opinions and beliefs.

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3 The direct translation of “majhi” from Bangla to English is “boatman”. The word was originally used to refer to the boat captains who help Rohingya cross the Naf river from Myanmar to Bangladesh. The majhi system was established after the 1991 Rohingya influx. Individual refugees were appointed as leaders, known as “majhis”, by government officials to support the CiCs and the police in maintaining control and order and act as focal points for camp management activities. A similar system had been in place in IDP camps in Rakhine State, where some refugees were appointed by the government to fulfil a similar role as a key liaison between the Myanmar military and the Rohingya population. (ACAPS, NPM Analysis Hub, 2018b)
LIMITATIONS

This approach has several limitations to be noted. First, there is a notable lack of anthropological or social studies literature on the Rohingya population that would support a richer analysis of their social norms and associated practices. A study that has explored Rohingya community values have often presented their findings within operational recommendations related to sectors or explicitly failed to explore the gendered nature of social structures and value systems. Similarly, gender and protection-related assessments focused on the Rohingya conducted in Cox’s Bazar and Rakhine lacked a focus on social norms and have aimed at translating findings into recommendations for sectors. This paper attempts to correct some of this collective ignorance by assuming that the same South Asian values systems that are shared with the Rohingya have many similarities. While this was validated in the consultations conducted for this paper, further confirmation and exploration of details concerning these practices is needed.

Another major limitation is the immensity of the scope of the consultations on ‘social norms’ or ‘gender norms’ with respect to every humanitarian sector and contextual dynamic. Due to a multiplicity of differing intervention modalities across the response along with a diversity of practices and perspectives among the Rohingya, not all social norms and value systems within Rohingya communities in camps in Cox’s Bazar can be easily or readily captured, especially since they are rapidly changing and diverging in different ways. In addition, these consultations focused on Muslim Rohingya community members, and the paper does not explore the social norms of minority Rohingya groups, including Hindu, Christian and Kaman groups displaced from Myanmar and living in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps. Furthermore, while these consultations tried to also include persons with disabilities and transgender populations in consultations, more dedicated and focused consultations are required to adequately reflect their voices. Generalizations that were shared by women consulted and analysed in this paper are not necessarily applicable to all organizations, approaches, affected people, etc., and it is better to understand these results as exploratory in nature rather than definitively conclusive on many points.

Further limitations include biases introduced by the researchers’ affiliations with UN Women or IOM, which may be observed through various programmes funded by each organization. For example, some consultations took place in women’s safe spaces because a lack of suitable spaces to hold such discussions, which may have led to findings being over-representative of women who use these spaces.

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4 This has been commented on and noted in Leider (2014) and Smith (2019).
5 Ripoll (2017).
6 Coyle et al. (2020).
In order to effectively analyse social norms, it is necessary to unpack to which extent this response has addressed gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls based on an understanding of Rohingya socio-cultural practices and values that do not align with Western socio-cultural norms. Specifically, prior to an analysis of Rohingya socio-cultural norms, it is important to first consider and unpack the ways in which the Rohingya have been increasingly labelled as “conservative” or even “backward” with respect to prevailing attitudes to women and girls. Escobar in particular identifies a process within development and humanitarian programming wherein “problems” are identified and “called out” for the “objective” impact on various indicators. Humanitarian and development problems, particularly related to women and girls or normative attitudes, are established within various sectors and disciplines to establish their validity as sites of intervention on their technical basis, as if they were scientific rather than moral or political questions or problems. On this basis, solutions are planned and imposed upon a population as if they were natural answers to what are actually normative and moral questions. Cislaghi, a social norms researcher, further observes of Escobar’s work:

“Interventions thus become the ‘right thing to do’ because they help people achieve (so called) value-neutral goals of health and economic development. But these goals bury a political and moral project under the camouflage of a technical one... International development institutionalizes those actions: orientalism becomes bureaucracy, so that it gets buried and hidden in the disciplinary mechanisms of the international development juggernaut, where it cannot be seen or called out anymore.”

Arguments made by feminist researchers have continuously become denatured, depoliticized when taken up by development and humanitarian institutions through simplifying frameworks and simplistic slogans. This critique is imperative to consider with respect to whether humanitarian interventions are actually “transformative” or simply impose changes using the powerful relief mechanisms. In this regard, Rohingya’s culture and social dynamics are considered to be “in need of reform” by the humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar for the value-neutral goals of humanitarian and development action that Cislaghi discusses. Spivak puts this more bluntly with her statement that, too often within these rhetorical spaces, “white men [and white women] are saving brown women from brown men.”

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This is not to suggest that transformative programming on social norms cannot meaningfully contribute to the lives of Rohingya, or that many women and girls do not object to how they are treated by their families, peers, husbands, and communities. Rather, it highlights that the question of “what needs to change” has failed to place Rohingya, especially Rohingya women, at the centre of this discussion and emphasizes the Rohingya people’s role as agents of social change within their own communities. In this regard, social changes are determined and set by humanitarian indicators and interventions, often brought in from other contexts where requirements for women and girls’ participation were developed in vastly different contexts and carry unquestioned assumptions before their application to Rohingya communities.

Practitioners need to be aware of their own normative assumptions and values, and how they are imposed upon Rohingya communities in ways that create backlashes since they have not been formed in more organic, community-driven ways. This is perhaps acutely felt by the Rohingya who are conspicuously absent within organizations’ management and excluded from participating in higher-level discussions concerning programming. Furthermore, the tendency to engage in and listen to voices within the Rohingya population that reaffirm the “correctness” and “objectivity” of our actions overwrites the multiplicity of perspectives encountered in this paper and other research.

In order to ethically and effectively engage in questions of social norms, it is therefore helpful to unpack and clarify what exactly is under scrutiny and study, and “what the problem is.” Simply put,

“Social norms are the informal rules of behaviour in a group. They are driven by beliefs we have about how people valuable to us think, behave, and what they expect of us, which in turn guide how we behave in specific situations. They define what is acceptable or appropriate, what is ‘normal.’”

Hence, it is important to discuss the effect they have, how they are experienced, and how they operate without referring to preferences and values that are not their own. Social norms are neither fixed targets nor evenly distributed within any group, and are affected by a range of factors that interact, shape and influence group norms. It is wrong to assume that certain norms persist without changing how they are practiced and operate within a given group – indeed, they often change from generation to generation even if they are experienced as continuous. There is a wealth of social norms-related terminology used in analysis, which has also been well documented in other works in the development and humanitarian field. While it is important to recognize the influence that social norms play on the lives of every individual, Cislaghi and Heise note that “human action almost never originates from a single cause” and caution against relying exclusively on norms-based approaches that risk “oversimplifying the true complexity of human behaviour.” They cite a range of studies that highlight the failure of exclusively norms-based approaches in changing behaviours. Indeed, they have recently proposed a “dynamic framework for social change” based on an ecological models for social norms work that were applied to violence against women (Heise, 1998). Their model incorporates four domains of overlapping influence that impact issues related to gender and power: institutional, individual, material and social. Their model reproduced in Figure 1 has overlapping spheres of influence that show intersections between these dynamics.
This model provides a valuable framing for analysing responses within the Rohingya community by allowing to understand how differing domains overlap to shape and support various behaviours:

“What is unique about this framework... is that it both highlights the importance of addressing change at those intersections—where social norms operate and programmatic action can be the most effective—and offers a tool to design intervention strategies that address interactions between factors.”

This is particularly true for questions surrounding how norms affect women’s access to and use of power. This model is in line with earlier, feminist social norms models such as Naila Kabeer’s social relations approach (1994) to gender and development programming that encourages analysis of how gendered social norms inter-relate with social relationships and underlying structural causes. While this model is a useful framing for social norms that will be used throughout the paper to discuss various intersections involving social norms within the response, Cislaghi and Heise caution against its universal adoption given that these spheres are arbitrary and often overlap if used to try to neatly categorize and identify the “objective problems” related to social norms and their associated manifestations. For example, programmatic incentives, such as money provided through cash-for-work interventions, are simultaneously institutional practices of humanitarian affairs and material incentives, which carry implicit implications for what types of work are suitable and available to participants based on their personal attitudes and social norms. While Cash for work interventions can be examined from any perspective, for the purposes of analysis, they are largely understood with regard to the material value they provide to participants, because this is how it was reported by Rohingya participants (i.e. as a means of accessing capital).

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13 ibid: 619.
15 Kabeer (1994).
17 Cislaghi and Heise (2019).
QUESTIONABLE HONOUR

For Rohingya, the central nexus between power and gender is evident in the established value system through which men and women’s actions are deemed “honourable” or “dishonourable.” Perhaps the largest and most predominant value system shaping women’s access to leadership positions and public space more generally was not the often discussed purdah system, but rather the izzot (honour) system that governs the social reputations of men and women in Rohingya and many South Asian communities. Izzot, as a value system, has already been discussed with respect to the Rohingya cultural practices in Holloway and Fan’s work, where the idea of ‘dignity’ for the Rohingya is explored, and was also discussed at length in previous consultations. To recall, for the Rohingya:

Izzot is something to be acquired through public performance of various actions, cultivation of specific qualities, and general adherence to religious and social norms. In this way, personal and collective forms of izzot play an orienting and anchoring role for Rohingya – they place individuals within larger collectives, like gusshi [clans], and give them social standing and purpose. The ways in which izzot is gained and accumulated are intangible and often imperceivable to outsiders; izzot can only exist and operate within tightly knit communities that are based on intimate social networks where people know each other, their clans, and their collective histories. It is only through this knowledge that a person’s or group’s izzot can be properly interpreted. Hence, izzot allows community members to develop and maintain standings within their larger collective identities and acquire a sense of belonging; however, the same processes that construct value also have implicit implications for how such standing can be lost.

It is important to understand that izzot was identified among the Rohingya as a system of social reputations whose basis was “derived from three sources: religious piety and observation of religious practices, financial wealth, and educational achievements.” And yet, previous consultations failed to explore the ways in which “honour,” in particular, its production and maintenance, is inherently gendered and differs significantly for men and women. The “three bases” upon which social reputations are produced are all inherently gendered in the sense that women and men all have different access to and restrictions surrounding them. First, their production of wealth, is inhibited through the social stigmatization of working women. Second, their religious practice, is restricted from religious spaces like mosques, and lastly, their education achievement, through customs like early marriage and restrictions on formal education that disproportionately affect women and girls. For men, izzot works as a social hierarchy that provides individuals, families and communities with status, but women’s actions and izzot largely operate according to different logics and carry different consequences for non-compliance that need to be fully explored. This is evident when a group of men repeatedly emphasized women’s breaking of purdah as more problematic than a Rohingya man who did not pray the required five times a day. This section will explore how izzot governs women’s access to leadership positions, markets, and public spaces similarly to other South Asian contexts.

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18 Holloway and Fan (2018).
19 Coyle, Rahim and Jainul (2020: 12).
20 ibid.
Both men and women participating in these consultations and other research have found that the Rohingya understand masculinity and men’s role within the family as producers and providers of wealth and izzot. This dynamic has been documented within the response, as a predominant feature of how izzot functioned in historical Rakhine and in other Rohingya displacement sites in India. Other research conducted among older Bangladeshi men have explored how wealthier men are perceived as more virile and more sexually potent, described as being a “sexually active Muslim and provider” – the essence of men’s understanding of hegemonic masculinity in Chittagong. While explorations of masculinity were not the direct focus of this research, similar variations and themes emerged; men discussed the loss of their livelihoods in different displacement settings, which was central to the Rohingya’s sense of purpose and belonging. One man explained, “From the time, I have become a refugee my manhood has halved, I have no house of my own, no place for agriculture without these I am just half a man.” Among men and women in the displacement camps, this feeling of “losing one’s role” has coincided with women’s participation and increased presence in many public spaces, leadership positions and paid forms of employment that were never before witnessed or experienced. As one woman commented:

“Now wives are not respecting their husband because they are not managing and providing everything the family needs. There is a decrease in their izzot but we still have to respect them even if they are only bringing rice and salt to eat.”

Historically, women’s experience of izzot across the subcontinent has been more closely linked with their sexual chastity and fidelity to her husband. Seira Tamang even goes so far to translate women’s izzot not as “honour” but as “sexual reputation” and writes:

“Patriarchy in Nepal, as in South Asia as a whole, demands that women’s sexual and reproductive behavior be controlled. Women are regulated through the tool of sexual reputation ‘ijjat,’ [izzot] with the negative labelling of an active, desiring female sexuality and positive labelling of active male sexuality.”

Rankin further explains, “women are regarded as ‘dangerous’... because they are located symbolically ‘in between’ the lineages of their father and their husband. For women, honour is associated with neutralizing this dangerous quality.” Due to the patrilineal traditions, women are never fully bound to their parent’s families and are always destined to leave their families’ clan when they marry; hence, investing resources in their education or training is disincentivized. This research found that Rohingya women’s access to spaces and adherence to various social norms changed at different times of their lives following interpretations of the social logics related to their honour. Girls and women’s lives are dominated by stages where pre-pubescent girls are initially freer from social expectations and norms surrounding women’s purdah and have access to public spaces because of their inability to reproduce. After menarche, this suddenly changes, and their reproductive potential is understood as volatile and dangerous. Adolescent girls and young women have the ability to reproduce but lack the stability, control and social acceptance provided through marriage and a husband. Divya Ruth Jose, who studied Rohingya women in displacement, describes a Rohingya women’s izzot as “her most prized possession” because in this period, it is most susceptible to irreparable damage should she become pregnant or if it is even assumed that she has had sexual
intercourse.\textsuperscript{26} After childbirth, women generally regain some access to public space though they may still be subject to scrutiny. This was observed in the fact that many women leaders in the camps tend to be older, married, and have had more than one child.\textsuperscript{27} It should also be noted that young men are also perceived as having too much “heat,” a euphemism for sexual energy, and it was suggested that older, married men were also more suitable candidates for marriage.

Hence, for men honour is something produced, whereas for women, honour is something that can only be lost - like her chastity - symbolized and evaluated through her actions and practices. Abstract social norms like “honour” become the critical nexus for power and control over women, and their influence in all other arenas or spheres related to institutional practices, material incentives, and individual attitudes are explored in this paper. A woman's honour depends on the men who control her and both their behaviours are further subject to the wider reference networks’ review. In this regard, as a part of hegemonic masculine practice, men are required to police or control their women and women generally expect to be policed, controlled and punished when they fail to maintain their honour. The contextual changes that occurred as a result of Rohingya’s displacement, however, has elicited a tremendous range of questions related to whether “what was honourable before is still honourable now” and disagreements surrounding the various interpretations of this question abound in all intersections explored in this paper.

\textsuperscript{26} Jose (2017: 26).
\textsuperscript{27} ibid: 31.
The interlinkage between a woman’s honour and a man’s control of it be seen more evidently in the practice of purdah, the Islamic practice requiring women to be veiled from “public” gazes or remain within “private” spaces controlled by the family. This is an older tradition in many Muslim communities but there are many different understandings of an individual’s practice purdah, why it is practiced, and what rules govern acceptable appropriate “veiling.” Purdah is practiced at various times of a woman’s life when her honour is generally perceived as being at risk. Hence, pre-pubescent girls are not required to follow purdah and generally, a girl’s sexual maturity coincides with the start of purdah as well as marriage. A full exploration of women’s experiences of both menarche, their bodies and menstrual cycles was not included in this work, but would complement any programming seeking to explore purdah traditions among women. Other social norms from South Asia and South-East Asia suggest that positive reframing of menstruation can be an important part of transforming social practices surrounding women’s role in society more broadly. Individual attitudes and practices concerning social norms such as menstruation and purdah are important for the potential reframing of women’s izzot overall and the actions that potentially compromise it.

Despite the significant and rapid transition that occurs for girls within Rohingya communities after menarche, little has been discussed in terms of their experiences of menstruation and the socio-cultural practices surrounding it. It is interesting to note that the most common way to refer to menarche and when a girl reaches puberty is “ghor goille,” which means “has gone inside the house.” Hence, it is clear that for many Rohingya women, the experiences of puberty coincide with the immediate cessation of access to public spaces. Young girls are exempt because they do not constitute full “persons” in public spaces, but this changes with the sudden occurrence of their first period. This is clearly a moment of confusion and is intertwined with many other cultural beliefs. As one girl reported:

“We have attached bathroom in our shelter. I take shower there every day when having my period. I don’t go out until my period is over. If I go out, then negative spirits will possess me. I only go out to bring water after the third day of my period. My elder brother helps me bringing water during this time.”

Other practices require menstruating women to carry objects made from iron metal such as screws, nails or keys, to protect themselves from djinn. Here, it is apparent that menstruation is considered something that makes women vulnerable to possession by djinn who might make them go mad and force them to “do things” that might compromise their honour.

The research revealed different interpretations of the practice, but most commonly, purdah involved covering the arms, body and face when outside of the home up to the wrist and down to the ankle – usually with a blouse, thami, a burka, socks, gloves and an umbrella. These

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28 Skidmore (2002); Bennett (2017).
29 Djinn are spirits in the Islamic faith.
30 A Burmese skirt.
31 The burka is a one-piece veil that covers the face and body, often leaving just a mesh screen to see through.
often coincided with movement restrictions that prevented, discouraged, or banned women from travelling outside their home, immediate locality or other vicinity without the permission and accompaniment of male members of the family. However, some had more stringent interpretations of purdah, as reported by one mosque committee member:

“Purdah means not only covering from top to toe, a woman’s voice can also be considered in it. If a woman speaks so loud from inside the house, and a man hears it and thinks if the voice is this beautiful then how beautiful she might be, creating this desire is also gunah [sin]. It’s gunah [sin] for both. So a woman should speak in a low voice to maintain her purdah.”

It is the arousal of any male desire that results in the loss of a woman’s honour, even if her actions were not intended to do so. Within this framing, male sexuality is understood within Rohingya communities as uncontrollable, naturalizing male sexual aggression against any woman who is the object of male desire, even if this is against her own wishes. Purdah was often discussed together with the ghera, meaning “fences” or “boundaries” that protect women’s izzot and delineate boundaries of purdah. As one Murobhi reported, “In Rakhine, when there are fences around the house that is one ghera. The rooms inside the house in another one ghera. A woman’s clothes are the third ghera.” There was also common agreement that purdah should not be interpreted as women not being allowed to “go out” even though it was also commonly reported that they did not do so in Rakhine. Rather, it seems that women were increasingly forced to “go out” in their current context and that this was acceptable as long as purdah was observed - i.e. provided that women adequately covered themselves. However, this transition has neither been smooth nor consistently accepted for various reasons.

The “acceptable” practice of purdah by young women and adolescent girls is often perceived as synonymous with a woman’s izzot. As explained by Liechty, “especially when it comes to marriage negotiations, a woman’s ijjat [izzot] is like an egg shell (or hymen): once damaged it cannot be repaired.” In this, Rohingya women and men reported that any of their actions that arose male desire was their fault and threatened their izzot. To manage this, purdah is the key means for women to assert and men to protect a woman’s izzot. For Loureiro, purdah is evidence of:

“...Men’s obsession for control and male dominance, identification, and centredness, [that encourages] men to accept male privilege and perpetuate women’s oppression, as well as [encourages] women to accept and adapt to their oppressed position even to the extent of undermining movements to bring about change... [In this system] Women’s honour and seclusion are then a measure of their protectors’ status.”

Mandelbaum similarly argues that it is men’s izzot that is reaffirmed through the practice of purdah and that they bear the responsibility for the protection and policing of women’s purdah in order to affirm their own izzot. Women’s izzot is both a reflection of individual actions of women, but also men’s control and enforcement of purdah on women, blurring individual and collective notions of izzot within families and groups. The ever-pervasive feeling that women’s izzot is always at risk of being stained like “ink on a cloth” was reflected in interviews and other research. From this perspective, purdah is a reflection of men’s individual attitudes about their wives and daughters rather than that of women, since they are the primary enforcers of the norm. Men also understand this as part of their own role within the community to call out unacceptable performance of purdah.

32 Loureiro (n.d.: 534).
33 Loureiro (n.d.: 534).
34 ibid; Mandelbaum (1988); Coyle, Rahim and Jainul (2020: 12); Solotaroff et al. (n.d.: 7).
Consultations also revealed that within the new context of the camps, women were in a difficult situation with respect to how they practiced purdah. Many women are in process of reimagining their social boundaries and what constitutes public spaces because all spaces are public, unlike their homes in Rakhine. Some women reported clear boundaries lines such as crossing the road or travelling outside the majhi block in discussions on what demarcated ‘public space’, which required them to wear veils and carry umbrellas when they went out. Others reported that they only travelled at night to public spaces where they were less likely to be “seen” by male gazes. A prominent dynamic that has emerged in displacement is the need for women to travel longer distances to a limited number of tube wells in the camp. Before displacement, women would carry water from nearby ponds and water sources as part of their work - often in localized spaces that were less public and more permissible for them to access because of the presence of their family members. Now women are forced to carry water through congested parts of the camps that are often farther from their homes. Begum describes a similar transition and anxiety in rural Bangladesh due to the higher level of arsenic in many wells that caused women to travel farther to fetch safe drinking water:

“As a result, the body becomes the site of social control of women and water comes to play a role in whether, how often and for how long female bodies are ‘out of place’ in fetching safe water, and thus subject to social norms, gazes, policing and punishment. In this respect, fetching water is a particularized burden for women, as notions of honour, shame and decorum affect quite literally their access to water.”35

The common demand for tube wells near every household that have arisen in this context is better understood as a specific demand from women to better allow them the means through which they can perform their gendered roles, in this case fetching water, while maintaining their izzot.

From another perspective, Rozario discusses how women also assert and engage in the practice of purdah willingly without being required to do so. She observes that there were many reasons that Bangladeshi woman choose to observe purdah and wear a burka: strategic-instrumentalist reasons (that they get something in return for maintaining purdah from their families and reference networks); due to personal piety and devotion to Islamic practice; due to the desire to promote a collective Islamic identity; and to “make sense” of middle-class Islamic practice in Bangladesh.36 For the Rohingya women and men consulted here, the women predominantly adhered to purdah traditions in order to maintain their own, and as a result, their husbands’ or their family status.

It also clearly emerged that some women strictly observed purdah instrumentally, as Rozario identified, in order to enable them to “acceptably” transgress other norms such as travelling away from the home, engaging in paid work, or working alongside men. One woman volunteer commented on how she was allowed to work with a humanitarian agency:

“**We are working here by maintaining our purdah. Community people don’t stop us from doing job. They tell us to maintain the purdah, not to talk with other men, not to do anything wrong and not to get involved with other man. They give us good advice. While working here, we have to talk with other men. But they are also working here in different NGOs. The community people know that, therefore there is no pressure on us. But when an outsider, someone who doesn’t work here and is not known by community people, then they take it negatively.**”

35 Sultana (2009).
Hence, women's active participation in and attitudes towards purdah do not necessarily entail, or mean that they are reinforcing more restrictive social norms regarding women. Interestingly, despite strict adherence to purdah, this woman's actions were still deemed unacceptable to outsiders. Here, we can see the performance of purdah as a poor indicator of how women are treated given the relative freedom that this woman had to work for an NGO with respect to other women in the camps. The balance between the frequent normative trade-offs that women and men are making as they renegotiate these values and practices in a new context needs to be fully understood if they are to be evaluated in terms of their impact on women's access to spaces and power.
ATTACKED HONOUR
THE IMPLICATION OF CONFLICT ON ROHINGYA IDENTITY

In order to appreciate the balance that a woman has to make between maintaining honour and engaging in activities that might compromise it, it is important to realize that regardless of their attitudes regarding purdah, their behaviours are heavily influenced by their larger symbolic significance to the Rohingya population. Guidance on work with social norms developed by UNICEF highlights and suggests the importance of identifying “units of belonging” for people within a group as part of the process of identifying social norms. This explicitly suggests exploring questions related to “which group do people feel they belong to (community, village, ethnic group, tribe, etc.) and look to for a sense of common identity”.37 In the intersectional model described above, Young identifies “signalling and symbolism” as one of the key compliance mechanisms, the reasons why people comply with social norms. For Young, “although the behaviours themselves are of little consequence, they have important reputational implications,” and he cites examples of purdah as a key example of this norm.38

The reputational implications on a woman’s izzot is clear, but the mass violence and human rights abuses recognised as genocide by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar and forced displacement have clearly led purdah to become an important part of signalling Rohingya identity. The wide range of human rights abuses experienced by Rohingya communities has often been described and understood as an explicit attack on Rohingya’s identity and sense of belonging, which has been historically under a progressive series of discrimination in an attempt to undermine and erase Rohingya’s belonging within Myanmar.39 Ripoll also notes the observation of Wakar Uddin, a prominent Rohingya activist, that Rohingya society and community have been subject to a “constant attack” by the institutions of the Myanmar Government that have “undermined the social fabric of Rohingya society”.40 Leider also notes the historical ambiguity of the Rohingya identity, and recent consultations by IOM have suggested that within the Rohingya refugee camps, Rohingya are a diverse group and experience “what it means to be Rohingya” in a variety of ways with respect to the various geographic, social and class backgrounds.41 These dynamics have combined in ways that enable a social anxiety about what it means to be Rohingya and a feeling of “loss” or “being under attack” coinciding with a lack of belonging to the same social structures and a loss of honour or reputation by men, families and communities.
For Rohingya, the question of belonging continues to prove difficult to answer directly beyond the basic self-identification as “Rohingya.” Although they all mutually express unity under a “Rohingya” identity, the significance and collective practices associated with this identity are still clearly under negotiation and subject to rapid changes. This is partly due to the many different ways that some Rohingya are observing behaviours of other Rohingya, which was at least partially shaped by their relative isolation from other Rohingya in Rakhine, their inability or lack of access to modern communication systems, and their different places of origin with their different attitudes and norms. This is significant because discussions among the Rohingya regarding social norms revealed uncertainty surrounding their practice as part of a larger sense of “what it meant to be Rohingya.” In addition, social practices were often described as being part of a religious identity as opposed to an ethnic identity, even when it was pointed out that many Muslims, including Bangladeshis, have different social norms related to practising Islam.

It is worth considering that women who reported that they had rarely, if ever, left their houses in Rakhine have now travelled to a foreign country, live in a large displacement camp where they routinely interact with people they do not know, and perform tasks that were historically never acceptable for women to perform. These shifts alone indicate that many Rohingya worry about the loss of their culture and identity because of these many changes, and many of them are concerned about Bangladeshi and global influences on their youth. In this, these changes are perceived as a result of displacement rather than a more gradual process of globalization. Consequently, they are experienced as being forced upon them in a context where they already experience little control or agency. Indeed, they occurred during the displacement when women’s bodies were particularly targeted for attack. As highlighted in research conducted by the Women’s Refugee Commission (2018), the gendered nature of the conflict against Rohingya overall served to inflict terror, humiliation and anguish on both the female and male survivors and observers, and to destroy “honours” of individuals and groups, and subjugate communities as a whole. This point may be particularly significant considering the gendered nature of the genocide and use of sexual violence and rape of Rohingya women as a weapon of war to “attack” the Rohingya identity in the years preceding and during the genocide – both undermining women’s ability to “produce the nation” and symbolically violating its boundaries. In this light, purdah and general control over women by individuals is a way to variously reinforce, protect and assert the Rohingya identity after it has been subjugated and undermined. This is by no means the first time women have become symbolic “border guards” who represent national or ethnic identities and their boundaries, and their adherence to symbolic and visible norms heavily relies on how the group perceives itself at risk of attack. To ignore the existing transformations taking place, the pace at which they are occurring, and the fact that many of them are experienced as being forced on them by different dynamics illuminates the anxiety and concerns that might arise from “losing control” over their own families, communities and identity.

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42 Coyle, Rahim & Jainul (2020).
44 Yuval-Davis (1993).
There are strong historical dynamics in how Rohingya women and men today are responding to the feeling that their identity or faith has been under attack since the colonial period, when Rakhine and Cox's Bazar were under the same administrative governance by the British up until 1912. Under British rule, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists were subject to sustained study and criticism by the colonial occupation and orientalist modes of control through academic study and military force. During this time, many South Asians converted to Christianity and Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist leaders felt that their identities were attacked and undermined. While largely unexplored and undocumented, Rohingya's religious practices are heavily rooted in Deobandi traditions, and related traditions such as the Tablighi Jamaat are documented in Rakhine and observed by programme staff in the camps. Deobandism arose as a Islamic revivalist movement in India as a response to British conversions from Islam to Christianity and emphasized the reform and reaffirmation of traditional Islamic principles as values whose decline was believed to be the reason that the British empire was able to defeat the South Asian, Muslim-led Mughal empire. Narratives developed in the subcontinent within Muslim communities and within the Deobandi tradition explained the conquest of the subcontinent by colonial powers as a result of Muslim's lack of true adherence to the teachings of Islam. A return to traditional Muslim values was understood and internalized as the rational response to an external threat. Charney also highlights how religious communalism was an important survival strategy in historical Rakhine in turbulent times. These revivalist traditions “attempted to reshape Muslim individuals, communities and societies to reflect the authentic tradition of the Muslim faith and religion, and promote greater uniformity within the Muslim world.” Similar to how the belief that the Mughal empire's failure to practice Islam properly resulted in the empire's decline and conquest by the British, some Rohingya also felt that failing to follow authentic Islam contributed towards the genocide. As one elderly man commented, “people are saying that the genocide was our fault because we had sinned. Maybe we did sin. Otherwise, what is the reason for our oppression? Men are crying during morning prayers.” Tabligh programmes were also identified by women leaders in the camp as playing a strong role in ensuring the continued practice of Islam according to Deobandi philosophy: one woman even recalls how she had “sent her husband to the Tabligh” reform programmes (chilla) upon discovering his adultery. Indeed, Amirsaa, leaders of the Tabligh programmes, were often referred to as key reference points concerning whether an action was acceptable or not.

Within early Deobandi movements, a general lack of Islamic education of and piety among both women and men became a pivotal part of reaffirming an Islamic identity. Gail recounts that:

“In the pre-1857 period, many Muslim reformists viewed the benefits of women’s education as twofold: first, women would become better companions to their husbands, better mothers and better homemakers; and second, women would become better Muslims and better moral and ethical guides for their children, and they would be more aware of their rights and duties within scriptural Islam.”

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46 Charney (1999).
48 ibid. 355.
Deobandi philosophy still has strong contemporary implications for Muslims in Bangladesh, where there are many Deobandi offshoots and schools, and where “the notion of female religious education as an ideological tool to resist the cultural changes caused by globalization and by the growing trend towards modern schooling for Muslims”.

As a result of these historical and contemporary influences, many Rohingya in this research emphasized women’s “lack of wisdom” as a central problem inhibiting their suitability to take on leadership roles. For many Rohingya, the historical denial of women’s education in Rakhine was used to explain why they lacked proper knowledge on how to behave and act like a “good woman.” Against this backdrop, women and their sexuality are considered to be naturally immoral and subject to dishonour without Islamic education and men have to control their actions. As one Rohingya woman serving on a leadership committee shared, “I used to yell at my husband when he would ask me to bring him water. Now I know how to respect my husband and be a good wife.” She also explained that “men deserve to be respected because they provide for us” at a time when many of them feel undermined and threatened by their inability to fully provide for women in ways that would allow them to remain in the home. She also mentioned that she participated in Tabligh preaching and education programmes, and had received religious education through them. According to the women on the committee, being a good wife coincided with their opportunity and acceptance in the community to be good leaders and to participate in Deobandi-based Tabligh preaching programmes. The trade-off of accepting women’s leadership was their active participation in spreading “authentic Islam” and upholding religious norms and practices surrounding it, particularly in ways that “spread elom” to women in order to help them to be “good Rohingya women.”

Many women explained that elom (wisdom) and education were equivalent to literacy and the ability to read and write in three key languages: Arabic, Burmese and English. Each potentially represents a significant aspect of Rohingya identity and its composite elements mentioned in earlier research. Arabic establishes the Islamic basis of the Rohingya identity, and ensures their ability to read and understand the Quran and Hadith directly, and transmit these teachings to their children. Burmese establishes and roots a woman’s identity in the geographic boundaries of Myanmar and claims their right to participate in public and national Burmese discourses. The use of English arises from their displacement outside of Myanmar where they are subject to and reliant on international processes of justice and discussions about them, which are held in English. This largely reaffirms the central aspects of Rohingya identity that were explored in earlier consultations as vaguely comprising religious identity (Muslim), geographic origins (Rakhine) and shared experiences (displacement and genocide). When women were more directly asked what they hoped to learn from being able to read and write in these languages, the answer was much less clear; it seemed that the ability to independently access information on their own was equated with having elom and being elomdar (a wise person). Many of the religious officials who were more open to women’s engagement in public spheres affirmed that it was due to a lack of education that was of concern, and that they readily this to be addressed as a prerequisite to women’s engagement in public spaces outside of the home. According to these world views, women are “precious, valuable and delicate,” and therefore need to be protected so as not to become spoiled or ‘stained’. However, this was used to justify why women should be educated, and many women reported that if someone is intelligent, then they can be murrobhi, a respected person.

Another perhaps more harmful interpretation of women’s capacity for wisdom that was encountered in the course of this research was the belief that woman have “smaller brains” and

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49 Begum and Kabir, 362.
50 Coyle, Rahim & Jainul (2020).
were naturally less intelligent. Indeed, this perspective is also found in Bangladesh and seems to be an alternate descriptive norm that justifies why women should be controlled by men mainly because of their likelihood to "go astray" due to a lack of education or of innate intelligence.\footnote{Rozaria (2006: 374).} In either interpretation, a woman’s adoption of traditional norms in some ways permits her engagement in spaces where she can show her capacity to have elom. When asked what had changed since they were in Rakhine, women reported that their participation in discussions, meetings and committees had either allowed them to obtain education and or "show their cleverness" in spaces they were previously denied. Women and religious officials also emphasized that women should have both “worldly” and “spiritual” elom resented by both religious education and formal schooling according to a modern state-based curriculum, such as the Myanmar national curriculum. By combining a traditional Muslim curriculum, provided through madrassas or programmes such as the Tabligh, with modern secular education of the Myanmar state, women’s education reflects an assertion of their Islamic faith and Myanmar nationality.

Women’s religious education clearly opened avenues for them to participate and understand important religious texts such as the hadith, which were used as a reference by women and religious leaders on which women’s actions and treatment were understood as socially acceptable. One woman who had particularly studied the text referenced all actions discussed in the consultations by their permissibility in the hadith and commented that a specific custom was “not in the hadith but was being practiced anyway”. The hadith outlines the traditions of the prophet Mohammad that govern and describe in great detail the correct behaviours that a pious Muslim should exhibit. Women’s education in the hadith has historically been a goal of Deobandi movements such as the Tabligh and is important for “reproduction” and “reform” of Muslim communities in the sub-continent.\footnote{Metcalf (n.d.: 592).} Religious education has no doubt enabled women better access to discussions and debates on the interpretation of religious norms that relate to and impact on their lives on a daily basis. Begum similarly notes that women’s “religious education [in Bangladesh] has inadvertently facilitated women’s engagement in the religious sphere.”\footnote{Begum and Kabir (2012: 376).}

Begum and this research find it problematic, however, to assume that such engagement has resulted in positive support for women’s various rights. Indeed, women leaders and male religious officials both identified hadith verses that justified and encouraged the beating of women. Yet, women’s religious education also seemed to enable them to interpret these verses as supporting symbolic and non-harmful beatings of women. One woman aptly commented that the hadith gave permission “to beat but not to harm their wives”. There are differing opinions on women’s participation in reformist Islamic traditions in South Asia, with some arguing that women’s participation enables a sense of agency. Others note that, within these traditions, women’s praise of men for being gentle and kind also raises genuine questions about their empowerment in such spaces.\footnote{Begum and Kabir (2012: 369).} Indeed, Begun concludes that the “entire mechanism for the formation of Muslim womanhood is not only focused on women’s religious piety and virtue, but also on enforcing gendered differences.”\footnote{Siddiqi (2012: 190).} Thus, while women’s religious education may indeed allow them to reinterpret restrictive social norms, it no doubt also reinforces gendered differences between men and women.

Outside of religious education and leadership, there are several women-led civil society organizations in the Rohingya camps that have mobilized, most notably Shanti Mohila and
Rohingya Women’s Empowerment and Advocacy Network (RWEAN). However, it should again be noted that, while both groups carry out a range of activities related to women’s rights and awareness raising, they are also politically oriented towards the objectives of repatriation with citizenship rights and redress for survivors of the genocide. Here, women’s political activism is again permitted because it is ‘in-line’ with overall objectives of the group, and the prevailing political agendas of both groups predominantly represent their public advocacy agenda. These groups also place women’s education at the focus of their objectives for women in the camps just like they do for other women outside these networks – possibly stressing education’s importance to different types of leadership spaces. As one RWEAN participant explained, demands for women’s education were again framed within their susceptibility to violence and control by others outside their small community of known people:

Some people living in my block along with religious leader used to question my frequent movements and they wanted to know where I went. So, one day, I invited them at my home and explained to them my responsibilities and the things I do for my community. I stated that if women had been strong, trained and raised their voices back in Myanmar, they would not have been raped. So, I explained that what we are doing here is not something that spoils women, and from that day these people understood me and were happy and never criticized about my movement.

It is interesting to note that while these women said the community largely accepted their work, there is clear indication that women’s leadership in public and political spaces is still not widely accepted. RWEAN’s founder was originally a member of another civil society organization and broke off because she claimed that the male-dominated organization in which she was originally a member only included her as a token. This suggests that claims or the desire to see women’s inclusion in these spaces does not necessarily lead to an actual transformation in how decisions are made or how groups operate.

Regardless, respondents reported that education became an interesting intersection of social norms and Islamic institutional values where women could assert their izzot and reinterpret or transform interpretations of various norms to be more inclusive. However, while educated women and women leaders who had elom were involved in leadership activities, they also variously confessed that they would also judge women for breaking norms. In addition to having obtained elom, there was a clear consensus overall that women who are older, married or widowed have much more access to leadership and empowerment opportunities and can practice less strict forms of purdah without it damaging their izzot. As one woman volunteer worker shared:

Most of the women who are working are married. Unmarried women don’t work because their families are concerned about their marriage. Families are afraid that they might not get married because of their work.

Cislaghi also cautions that the past several decades of scholarship have revealed the many ways in which men and women both support patriarchy gender systems.56 Regardless, the women’s education was genuinely favoured by everyone and deemed a desirable and appropriate way to respond to the feeling of Rohingya identity being attacked - perhaps partially because it could make them “more pious” and “wise.” In addition, there is a clear value in having women leaders who act as their own change agents and interpreters of social norms, which is critical for engaging women in the transformation of social norms and provide both men and women role models of educated, female leaders. Again, it seems that giving women educational opportunities to show their intelligence is key.

56 Cislaghi (2019:15).
Islamic institutional norms are not the only set of institutional practices and norms that continue to have a pervasive impact on the Rohingya. Indeed, Cislaghi notes that in addition to religious norms or rules that form a key institutional system through which to operate, there are legal and other institutional governance structures that impose, govern and punish behaviours. Kabeer also points to the need to understand underlying causes of gender inequality through a broader institutional analysis – pointing out the limitations to understanding norms solely through their operation within households’, families’ and communities’ understanding of social norms and practice. Accordingly, practitioners need to be aware of how humanitarian programmes and relief instruments that select beneficiaries, divide resources and permit or deny various actions are institutional arrangements that shape normative behaviours and expectations. Kabeer argues that institutions ensure the production and reinforcement of social dynamics that create and perpetuate social difference and inequality: rules of humanitarian programmes essentially dictate what is allowed, how it is done, by whom, who will benefit and who makes the overall decisions about who receives what and who can claim what. Within the space of the response, these decisions and rules are often developed based on international best practices that do not effectively take into account or question the implications and assumptions that such best practices have on local contexts and lives.

Similar to governance under humanitarian systems, the Rohingya have a long history with institutional structures where decisions are made without their active involvement. The interactions between communal and state governance systems in contemporary Rakhine have been generally explored in previous work under this series, and it has already been noted that Rohingya and Rakhine leadership systems rarely included women. In his examination of local organizations in Rakhine, Munsoor only found evidence of one woman serving on a leadership committee because she had managed to obtain an education and could serve as a link to other women in the community. However, what has yet to be explicitly explored is the tension and pressure that many Rohingya reported between governance of their own community structures, led mostly by male representatives of prominent families, and the governance of the Myanmar state authorities, including the General Administration Department, led mostly by non-democratically appointed non-Rohingya state representatives. Within traditional systems of governance during the 20th century, the Rohingya largely reported self-governing through

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58 Kabeer, Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development.
59 ibid.
60 See Coyle, Rahim & Jainul (2020) under this series for further discussion on the issue.
61 Munsoor (2013).
Shariah is an Islamic religious law that governs not only religious rituals, but also aspects of day-to-day life.

Camp administrators appointed by the government of Bangladesh.

Structures such as Shomaz, committees of community leaders, that make their decisions based on a mixture of prevailing social norms, their interpretation of shariah law, and local power dynamics. Here, there is a notable and quick conflation between social acceptability and institutional practice. The two concepts clearly mirror each other as the key reference networks for social norms, and religious and non-religious community leaders, and are also responsible for the governance of the community and provision of justice. However, as the Myanmar Government began to progressively extend controls and institute restrictions on Rohingya, there has been a notable loss of control over critical social norms-related issues regarding the imposition of these new rules.

Among these rules were restrictions and administrative barriers that made it difficult for the Rohingya to marry, travel and even operate businesses. This dynamic is well known and documented in other research related to the discriminations experienced by the Rohingya in Myanmar, and many of the more recent policies regarding marriage and controls on population were introduced as recently as 2015. As one elderly man recalled:

In Rakhine when you wanted to get married you would have to go to the Raika office to pay them money. Sometimes it was 40,000 BDT or 60,000 BDT. You would also have to pay bribes. They would send the information of married couples to the Nemre (military HQ) who would approve and investigate it. They would not allow us to get married before the age of 18. The process would take up to one year and the fees were half of the total marriage cost. If the marriage costed 10 lakh, then the fees would be 5 lakh.

According to some Rohingya, these attempts by the Tatmadaw (the armed forces of Myanmar) went so far as to try to force Rohingya women to end purdah. One man reported that the military tried to force women out of their houses and demand that they remove their burkas, an attempt that was reportedly stopped by religious leaders of the Rohingya community. Again, the conflation between social norms such as purdah, the conflict, Rohingya identity and institutional policies can be seen to reinforce contestations, policing and scrutiny of women’s bodies.

The regulation of marriage is now subject to Bangladeshi law and reinforced through aid registration systems and bureaucratic practices, such as the Smart Card registration process. Most notably and frequently discussed in consultations were the new practices surrounding the governance and the registration of marriages in the camps by Camp in Charges (CiCs), who were given the responsibility for officially recording marriages, deaths and divorces among Rohingya refugees by the Government of Bangladesh. While it is clear that many marriages and deaths in the camps are not recorded, as was reported by respondents, most of whom reported that the process of registering a marriage or divorce followed a similar path, i.e. that first, majhis were contacted concerning the event, were often paid to arrange the necessary meetings and prepare relevant documentation, and then review the marriage/divorce applications which would later be either approved or rejected by CiCs. During the review process, the age of the girl and the boy were both checked in accordance with Bangladeshi law, which required that men be 21 years of age, and girls at least 18 years of age before marriage. Early in the response paper, identification cards were used, and respondents reported that to allow for earlier marriage of daughters, paperwork would routinely be forged or payments were made to circumvent these restrictions. Now CiCs reportedly maintain age registries according to the Smart Registration system in which age information is not permitted to be changed other than at the time of registration. While many have reported that families again lied during

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62 Shariah is an Islamic religious law that governs not only religious rituals, but also aspects of day-to-day life.
63 Coyle, Rahim & Jainul (2020: 20).
64 Camp administrators appointed by the government of Bangladesh.
registration to make their daughters appear older so that they could be married sooner, others reported that they were now worried that if the marriage was being registered through the CiC, then it would be significantly harder for them to marry their daughters.

It is difficult to understand the net impact that this is having on the rate of early marriage, since many also reported that this is simply a social practice where families and religious officials, such as murrobhi, are mere witnesses of them. The couple live together until they are of legal age to officially register. An examination of demographic figures produced through the Smart Card registration process offers some insight into this dynamic (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Groupings</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Difference (m-f)</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infants below 1 year</td>
<td>12,014</td>
<td>11,382</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children between 1-4 years</td>
<td>56,644</td>
<td>54,572</td>
<td>2,072</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children between 5-11 years</td>
<td>98,953</td>
<td>95,390</td>
<td>3,563</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children between 12-17 years</td>
<td>60,709</td>
<td>56,331</td>
<td>4,378</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults between 18-59 years</td>
<td>169,681</td>
<td>211,976</td>
<td>-42,295</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly over 60 years</td>
<td>17,517</td>
<td>13,992</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>415,518</td>
<td>443,643</td>
<td>-28,125</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Certain trends can be seen here. While the population figures have always been skewed towards women in general because of the genocide and events of displacement, this only applies to the adult age range of 18–59 years. Importantly, there is a significant difference in the number of men and women within the 12-17 year old and 5-11-year age ranges. The significantly greater number of boys may suggest that girls within these age ranges report higher ages during registration in order to fall outside of the bracket/age of their Smart Card registration and allow them to marry. This may indicate that the early marriage rates in the camps could be much higher than anticipated. It can therefore be suggested that as many as 2,847 girls reported being at an age range higher than their true age range, or possibly even more girls given the disparity in the different adolescent age ranges. It also raises questions about why there are 10,645 fewer girls than boys under 18 and how many of the 42,295 more women within the adult range are actually under the age of 18. While earlier numbers were subject to a host of problems associated with “beneficiary faking” to obtain greater amounts of relief, these numbers are biometrically registered to prevent double counting. Another possible reason could be that girls did not register in Smart at the same rate, perhaps again to avoid restrictions on marriage, or because they were married off to people outside the camps. However, it is unlikely that many families do not register specific family members because the amount of relief they would receive would then be proportionately reduced.

Family formations in general seem to have been significantly impacted by the registration processes of multiple agencies. As discussed in earlier consultations, Rohingya in Rakhine were likely to live in large family or clan units and nuclear families were exceptionally rare.65 Now, according to the UNHCR Population Figures based on their Smart biometric registration system, the average family size is 4.2 persons per households. While this could be evidence that households are free to declare their family formations as they desire, there is a considerable question as to why people would register in smaller units than what they are culturally or historically accustomed to. In the consultations and discussions on this issue, it appears that many households reported to functionally optimize the size of their household units to maximize the amount of relief they can receive through various relief incentives that are

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65 Coyle, Rahim & Jainul (2020).
provided on the basis of household sizes. For example, some households reported that having children allowed them to receive more relief since younger children received the same food allowance as fully grown adults even though they did not consume as much. In other cases, people reported that having family sizes of certain numbers could ensure that they would receive additional relief. For example, the decision to provide shelter materials in some camps can be based on household size, in which households with 12 family members would be afforded two shelter kits, whereas those with 11 would not be – the doubling of valuable assistance provided based on the difference of a single family member. Other relief programmes provide larger households with less than a smaller household would be provided with, because the assumption is that the former have better coping systems or can share more. However, in the case, this functionally incentivizes a household size that matches the size of a nuclear family regardless of its actual composition. While this mismatch might seem insignificant, it certainly has a significant impact on how families, and women particularly, access aid since representatives of the household are required to collect or engage in different aid activities and practices.

Today, the rigorous institutional checking of marriage and family documents against bureaucratic documents is extremely new for the Rohingya. All camps had some form of age verification systems in place that increasingly rely on the Smart Card registration process as the official ID for Rohingya refugees. While this may reduce the number of “official” marriages that occur because of the institutional requirement to collect marriage certificates prior to changing their family attestation documents, the effect is largely unclear, and the demographics suggest that there are a range of reasons and dynamics that could influence how the Rohingya respond socially to such controls. These policies no doubt further reinforce a sense of not being in control of their own lives and social practices. Men’s feeling of “losing control” is shown in their no longer being able to control their daughters’ marriages according to their own prescribed logics of izzot. This anxiety was not shared only by fathers, but also by mothers. Informal marriages outside of this process are now disincentivized because they would not be officially recognized through relief structures, and assistance would technically fall outside of a given family unit. Elsewhere in Bangladesh and South Asia, these controls are less stringently enforced, and many families simply wait to register early marriages until the bride and groom reach the legal age or pay for the relevant documents to be changed.

Although the authors were unable to find any data regarding divorce rates, it was observed that divorce is governed similarly to marriages. However, there was a reported increase in the number of divorces to the extent that some CiCs had begun to increasingly restrict the grounds on which divorces were accepted. As one young man reported:

*The divorce rate has become higher because after marriage the boys are divorcing them for simple things or nothing. They go to the CiC to secure the marriage sometimes. Some people have gone to the CiCs five or six times to get divorces. Now some CiCs are starting to say that you are no longer allowed to get divorces.*

Moreover, there were additional reports of men and women divorcing, and re-marrying or reuniting, which many felt was prohibited in Islam; divorce should be a final decision on the separation of couples. It was reported that other CiCs were reportedly holding ‘divorce courts’, where they reviewed the reasons and validity behind divorce requests; some CiCs even went so far as to record the mahr paid during marriages and penalty fees charged to men who divorced their wives without sufficient justification. It should be noted that CiCs govern this aspect of camp life in addition to their other work and responsibilities, and it seems that there is

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66 Mahr is a payment, in the form of money or possessions paid by the groom, to the bride at the time of Islamic marriage.
little support for them despite the evidence that they are actively working on a regular basis to support Rohingya women in these situations.

Overall, all of the community and governance structures and institutional arrangements, including the humanitarian response, are dominated by Bangladeshi men in positions of senior leadership such as CiCs, Assistant CiCs and army officials, where such norms and practices are agreed upon and set, and none include Rohingya representatives. The means through which institutional controls are increasingly enforced are perceived as likely to exacerbate social feelings of loss of control and ‘compromised honour’, especially controls such as the extension of the time between a girl’s menstruation and her marriage. Hence, women have difficulty expressing their opinions and beliefs through these traditional structures because they are, by normative necessity, controlled by men and exclusive of women and their perspectives. Similarly, by approaching male leaders, women are again forced into “breaking purdah” because these men are from outside their households. Here, there was mutual acknowledgement by men and women that, in leadership positions, women must be segregated from men. As one woman stated:

*Man, murrobhis [senior or respected person], imams have said that women going out is gunah [sin], women cannot be leaders, talk in front of men, and women have less intelligence... In a family, the husband will take the decision. He will be the murrobhi. If there are also my in-laws there, then they will be the murrobhis and take the decisions. Woman can also murrobhi. When a man goes out for work and the woman has to look after the house then, in that sense, she becomes a murrobhi. But they show respect to the husband. There is no age limit to be a murrobhi. If someone has intelligence then they can be a murrobhi. If my son goes to school and studies, then he will be having much more knowledge than us. Then he will be the murrobhis. But when father is there son cannot be the murubbi. Basically, women are the murrobhis of a family. She looks after the family but we only show respect to the men and consider them as a murrobhis... So man and woman are equally murrobhis. Here [in Bangladesh] woman has become murrobhis. On the basis of taking care of the family, women have become the murrobhis but the decisions of the family will still be taken by the husband.*

This would suggest that leadership is also deferred to men and elderly men within the family in ways that prevent women from taking on leadership positions when they are there. Institutionally, this is replicated in community and governance institutions throughout the camps so that gender integration is neither fully welcomed nor a space in which women can be murrobhi without breaking their purdah rules or showing disrespect to the men. In this light, gender-integrated programming or failing to create gender-segregated spaces for discussion and decision-making allows little room for women to voice their concerns in a socially acceptable manner.

In addition, the women respondents said that CiCs’ governance had opened new spaces for them to engage in as never before. One group even commented that the CiCs were fairer and more equitable in providing justice than the men from their own communities in Rakhine, because they were willing and capable of ruling in favour of women on issues like divorce. This is certainly partially or predominantly because CiCs and humanitarians sit outside of Rohingya social compliance mechanisms that encourage and enforce social norms through institutions. The above testimony of CiCs ruling against men’s repeated divorce of women is evidence of this dynamic, and participants recounted that this created spaces for women to contest men’s control. Yet, it is important to see institutional arrangements within the response as being a set of rules that are largely imposed on a culturally different group that has no means of informing or changing institutional practices, and in this regard, there is little scope for transformative approaches except to transform people’s opinions of the institutional arrangements.
It is important to consider that institutional arrangements are powerful systems that can enforce compliance and often enmesh with various norms and values but do not always drive social transformation. For example, legislation that provides fathers with paternity leave is often underutilized due to the stigma against men taking such leave. Indeed, a series of extremely powerful material incentives in a resource-poor context where Rohingya families struggle to have income to meet their basic needs underlies the institutional arrangements of the response. Earlier consultations revealed that Rohingya across the camps equally perceived themselves as “poor people living under tarps” and a desire for income-generating activities dominates programmatic requests. Displacement has had a profound impact on social structures and systems in ways that have destroyed collective units and erased individual’s and group’s izzot; currently, communities “are imagined and experienced as disconnected social units that lack the necessary wealth to reproduce izzot and thereby recreate connection, unity, and belonging among members.” Indeed, the current financial pressure experienced by families is having a tremendous impact on social norms related to honour and its social production.

The demographic imbalances between younger women and men are driving larger patterns of social behaviour with respect to both izzot and dire financial situations that many families face. For Rohingya families, the time between their daughter’s menstruation and her marriage is a difficult and precarious one. This is a time where the potential is the greatest to harm or threaten her families’ collective izzot and hers. Furthermore, this is leading families to adopt a range of coping strategies that harm their daughters and their families’ well-being. This perceived threat to a girl’s honour may result from a girl's actions or attacks against her, and she will always be blamed regardless of her own actions. While in Rakhine, marriage occurred early after this transition in order to minimize this time period, in the camps many respondents reported that marriage was generally delayed primarily due to changes in marriage registration and an inability to pay dowries, which were previously never required or mandatory. Before displacement in Rakhine, the predominant tradition was that the groom or groom’s family would pay the bride a mahr, an allotment of gold or money to be used as a family safety net. Traditionally, this was intended for the bride, and a dowry paid to the groom or groom’s family was not permitted, because many Rohingya believed that it was not condoned in the Quran. However, one woman explained the changes that have occurred:
“It takes at least one half tikal [25,000 BDT roughly] of gold to pay as mahr by grooms to get married, in camp usually it takes a full tikal or sometimes two. Now the girls’ family has to pay double what we receive from the groom’s side as Mahr. No one has this money now so girls and boys both cannot get married. It used to be that girls married at 18 but now there are girls who are 25 and are still not married. No one wants to marry elder girls and say that they are old, even if they are only 25 years old. Only older men will marry them and even then they still have to be paid.

Following an extended discussion of the social norms surrounding women’s work and izzot, these women raised the issue of dowry payments in response to an open-ended question of whether they had any concerns they wished to share with the research team. They felt that delayed marriages between people in the camps was a critical issue affecting women. One man reported directly to the principal researchers that he felt great anxiety that he was unable to arrange marriages for his two daughters, even though many young men had visited his house to meet them.

They and others reported that this new dynamic drove women to marry older men and has lead to an increase in the number of divorces because men were able to earn money this way. As a group of young men noted, the issue is being debated by religious leaders:

Twó murrobhi were debating in our block about the new practice of dowry. One is saying it is halal and the other is saying it is haram.68 They are debating publicly about this. The person who said it is halal said it is permissible because the bride’s family is willing to give dowry. The one who was saying it is haram was arguing that it is only halal if the bride’s family actually has enough money and actually is happy to give groom something as gift. He said the groom’s family should not ask for dowry. He also said that in the camp conditions this is completely haram because it is becoming a culture that girls’ families are borrowing to pay dowry and now the groom's family expects dowry. All are poor here, so there is no way to give something willingly.

When this issue was explored further with other groups, it emerged that the practice of providing grooms with gifts began to develop, in the period leading up to the 2017 influx, because many men had begun to leave Rakhine in search for better work. One person reported that only 3 to 5 per cent of the grooms were not receiving a dowry in the camps, although this figure is anecdotal.

Respondents also reported that the camp environment is perceived as unsafe for women due to congestion and a large number of unknown men with whom women are forced to interact or somehow be exposed to. This has also affected the selection of grooms. Whereas marriages were previously arranged through the groom’s mother, who would be able to see and speak with potential brides before the marriage to assess their attractiveness. In this system, an attractive girl, as determined primarily by the groom’s mother or others who had seen her face before her menarche, could be married to a “good boy” from a wealthy family with izzot.69 As one young man reported:

In the camps, boys with ‘less good’ qualities are getting married to girls from izzotdar70 families. They would never be able to marry a daughter from such families.

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68 Forbidden in Islamic law
69 Handani families are families with more izzot and generally higher status ghussi (clan) within a shomaz (community) (Coyle et al. 2020).
70 Families with izzot.
Marriage is getting expensive because the number of boys are less and the insecurity of the girls is great. The parents are worried about the security of the girls. Parents now borrow money to marry off their daughters to whoever they can. They are trying to marry their daughter before losing their izzot.

There is need to further explore the extent to which these practices continue to be contested, which are no doubt a driving factor behind a range of related harmful practices such as forced and early marriage, polygamy, and marriage-related human trafficking. In many places in South Asia where dowry practices are commonplace, the payment of a dowry, or the failure to pay an adequate dowry, is intimately associated with dowry-related violence, which is expected to increase. Indeed, dowry demands were reported to have already led to divorces because families were unable to pay the full promised dowries after marriage.

Financial pressures are not only preventing or driving higher costs associated with dowry payments, but also compromising women's honour by incentivizing their engagement in paid work outside their houses or under the control of men outside the family. Of particular note were the ways in which many people reported that working together or alongside each other, performing the same work, was a source of fitna or aif – both difficult concepts to explain. Fitna, formally translated as “temptation” or “sedition,” is a complicated term in Arabic with multiple meanings and uses. In the Rohingya language, fitna is a term used by religiously educated persons to describe the “potentiality of sin” through exposure to non-religious activities, including the mixing or interaction of men and women who were not relatives. Others used the term aif, which is both a feeling of shyness and of being disrespected to a certain extent. Indeed, many said that women should not work alongside men because women will feel aif and their izzot would be harmed. Women leaders in particular commented that they disagreed that women should feel forced to compromise their izzot by working alongside men and performing the same types of work as men. They also pointed out that this put them in direct competition with men over the limited number of income sources within the camp and challenged men's role as providers. Cash-for-work interventions in particular was a point of contention since the work performed was traditionally perceived as “men's work” and men perceived women's entrance into these spheres as being a direct challenge to their masculine role as providers, which, as previously discussed, has already been compromised since the displacement. Other points of contention were the requirement that male and female volunteers of NGOs to work together, side by side, thus forcing them to speak with each other and interact, leading to aif and compromising the izzot of female volunteers. This was particularly true given that many female volunteers were often younger, without children, and sometimes unmarried. As one woman volunteer teacher shared:

*We are working here by maintaining our purdah. Community people don't stop us from doing job. They tell us to maintain the purdah, not to talk with other men, not to do anything wrong and not to get involved with other man. They give us good advice. While working here, we have to talk with other men. But they are also working here in different NGOs. So community people know that, therefore there is no pressure on us. But when an outsider, like who doesn't work here and the community people don't know them, then they take it negatively.*

Loureiro highlights similar dynamics in rural Muslim Pakistani communities, where rumours surrounding “immoral activities” of women working with foreign NGOs, including incidents of a “sexual nature,” led to a crackdown and restriction of women engaged in these spaces.\(^7\) All

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\(^7\) Loureiro (n.d.).
parties seemed to want this practice of working side by side to stop, claiming that it encourages immoral actions in their communities, which they felt could be achieved by increased policing of women.

The only exception to these restrictions reported by respondents was for widows, who were believed to have “no choice” since they lacked husbands to provide for them. Widows are not “desirable” marriage partners since they have already been married to another man and suffer the same stigma that divorcees do; hence, the aptly applied metaphor that a “women’s izzot is an eggshell or hymen”. Widows were often cited as examples of women’s capability of working to earn money just like men. However, many felt, that this did not extend to all women. In one discussion with women leaders, two women who sold homemade snacks and food were frustrated by the fact that another woman in the group said that their work was considered dishonourable and prohibited because they were married. It is important to note that both men and women uphold norms that police and judge women and men who interact or perform the same work. When women leaders in a group were asked whether they would think negatively of women working alongside men, some agreed and felt that they were doing a dishonour to themselves and their families. Here, women and men are both forced to make difficult trade-offs between the immense value that income has in alleviating financial pressures and the compromising positions that women feel forced to engage in across the camps. Further, consultations highlighted that if female community representatives received no financial incentives or compensation for taking on these additional community and decision-making roles in the public sphere in addition to their domestic roles as caretakers and wives, it would become harder for them to negotiate with their husbands to gain their permission to do so. While this would not benefit the family financially, it would risk jeopardizing their social status and honour.

Within these dynamics of dowry-related payments and work, izzot has a clear price. And while the transactions surrounding it involve entire communities and families, it is the women and girls who ultimately pay the consequences of having their actions, bodies and honour scrutinized since they increasingly carry very real material implications. Liechty and Rankin noted in other South Asian contexts the ways in which izzot systems are inherently linked to markets and the capacity to earn; Liechty coined the term “izzot economy” to describe “a realm of moral prescriptions of sexuality, especially for women, that are “never only a moral economy or a material economy [but] always both.” In this respect, Rohingya women’s engagement in new spaces is operating within a zero-sum paradigm that requires them to reinforce their honour through other actions lest it diminish their fathers’ or husbands’ masculinity and their own honour. The “tyranny of [izzot],” as Mark Lietchy describes, is such that women, “by choice or by economic necessity, are entering new arenas and situations, transgressing traditional boundaries and almost inevitably labelled as prostitutes or loose women regardless of the actions they take.” Entering these spaces is increasingly perceived in a “cost-benefit” dynamic, where women consider the risks they take in engaging in leadership roles and market activities, or even simply performing day-to-day chores in terms of the potential benefits it brings to them and their family. Many of these activities are organized in such a way that they are perceived to promote or create socially unacceptable spaces for women. Therefore, they generally been poorly received by Rohingya men and women alike, who feel that they have been forced to operate in lose-lose situations to meet their basic needs.

73 Liechty (2010:327).
Every Rohingya used to have one of these gara [traditional clay pitcher] in their house to store water. Even in the dry, hot months the water would be cold. Colder even than water from a refrigerator. Rich or poor everyone used to buy the same pitcher from me. The top half of the pitcher is made by men and the bottom part is made by women. Women are needed to connect the neck of the pot to the bottom. Men cannot do that. Men cannot make the bottom part and women cannot make the top – it has always been this way. This is women’s work and this is men’s work. After it is fired it is very strong and cannot be broken unless it slips from your hand. I can teach you my craft but it will take you years to learn. I am still a student myself.

- Rohingya Potter, over 80 years old

During this research, one of the principal researchers in the investigation team had the opportunity to meet an elderly Rohingya potter who, in describing his craft, also described his reliance on his wife’s contribution to produce even the simplest and most common of clay pots. In the Rohingya potter’s world, even his clay is gendered and signifies the belief in innate differences between men and women. Women and men have their own gender-specific contributions to every piece of work; they are not expected or supposed to do the same work or contribute in the same way, but both of their contributions are required in order to complete the work.

This observation is an interesting way through which to reconsider the criticisms of development and humanitarian interventions that began these consultations: i.e. that there are often implicit impositions of structures, incentives and norms contained in the design of any intervention that are often unintended, unseen, or undesirable on those that they claim to support. This is not to say that this can be avoided within humanitarian interventions, but rather to point out how more full consideration of this impact and consultation with the people that these systems impact could encourage healthier, more productive social transformations. This is especially true for women, given that this paper has also explored the ways in which their bodies have become critical “sites” for the expression and policing of the Rohingya identity and social morality. Engaging women in ways that force them to question their honour is challenged; although it is now understood as a necessity, this does not mean that it is accepted. Women’s honour is in a state of precarity, because women negotiate spaces and actions that compromise and threaten existing interpretations of conventional morality. They often make difficult trade-offs to present themselves as “honourable women” who are increasingly forced into doing “dishonourable things,” such as participate in committees, stand in relief lines, work in cash-for-work programmes, and remain unmarried. Hence, honour is in transition, and simultaneously understood as in need of transition, ideally by the people whose honour is in question.
Based on the consultations undertaken for this paper, which are in no way a replacement for the necessary in-depth consultations related to the different interventions, the following observations and considerations may enable humanitarians to better understand their work:

All ongoing and planned activities, programmes and interventions should be reviewed together with Rohingya women and men, and changes made based on their inputs. Overall, there should be a more proactive engagement with Rohingya women and men at all stages of the programme cycle, and they should be involved in programme design to ensure that humanitarian relief better reflects their social norms, attitudes and practices. These consultations found a high degree of willingness among the Rohingya community to better discuss how programmes are causing unintended social impacts or exacerbating pre-existing concerns, anxieties and problems. If Rohingya voices, including women's voices, lead processes of transformation, social norms transformation will occur more smoothly and effectively.

Programmes should seek to more actively and seriously consult with women and men, including Rohingya women and men who are recognized as leaders and reference groups for social norms in their communities, on the ways in which they are engaging with women, including in relation to the findings and recommendations outlined in this paper. These norms will shift over time, and these conversations can be regularly revisited for women and men to reframe their opinions as they also change over time. This is particularly true for distributions that require men and women to stand in the same lines and for shared water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities. Gender segregation is currently a key value, which should be proactively considered for all programmes and interventions. In contrast, forcing the integration of genders is causing backlash, and a resultant increase in gender-based violence, even though there are many people who are not against women's work, entry into public spaces, and non-traditional arenas. There is no reason that provisions cannot be made to engage women separately and allow them to dictate what is acceptable for their engagement.

Findings in this paper show that there are less social norms restrictions on women to be engaged in activities outside the home provided that they are within their own close community of people they know; another key entry point is to focus initially on involving women in activities within their own camp block areas only. The geographical space agreed on by the community for women's engagement can then be gradually re-assessed in consultation with the women and men in the community. Access for women of all ages to appropriate training, mentoring and literacy activities should be promoted if they are expected to engage in leadership positions, including in committees and representational structures. Programmes can encourage and support this in various ways by structuring training so as to allow women to participate more easily, such as having female instructors and female peer-mentoring, and holding training in gender-segregated spaces.

Religious leaders should be consistently consulted on programmes and activities to better understand their perspectives and how compromises may need to be reached. Religious interpretations and rules play a large role in governing whether activities will be perceived as socially acceptable. Religious dynamics are a key social norms reference system that set group norms and rules for women and girls.

The impact of registration practices and incentives for families of different sizes should be further explored. It is clear that the Rohingya are responding to these institutional practices in ways that can potentially be damaging to their well-being and are likely to disproportionately affect women and girls.
Material incentives provided by any programme working with women must not be the sole reason for women to engage in such spaces, and, in the case of income-generating activities, the activities must be acceptable to the wider community, their husbands and leaders. Material incentives are tremendously powerful motivators, but may create backlash if they force women to engage in ‘dishonourable’ activities.

Spaces should be created for Rohingya to discuss their culture and share it with the outside world in ways where it can be publicly appreciated. Restoration of Rohingya control over their group identity and fostering appreciation for their traditions, history and culture may alleviate pressures and anxieties about it being lost.

GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR ALL INTERVENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SOCIAL NORMS:

In order for practitioners to better understand the dynamics related to social norms within their own interventions, a series of guiding questions can be asked among them and discussed with Rohingya men, women, boys and girls within their programming to better ensure that programmes have the desired impacts on social norms dynamics:

- How are men and women able to participate together in the programme? Does the programme make separate arrangements for women and girls' participation that do not require them to participate in the same way as men or as if they were men?

- Are there incentives related to women or men's participation that require women and girls to break social norms or take actions that compromise their honour? Can this be changed to allow for their engagement without compromising their honour?

- How do men and boys feel about how you are engaging women and girls in the programme? Have men and boys' concerns about women's engagement been discussed with them?

- How do women and girls feel about how the programme engages men and boys? Have women and girls' concerns and preferences about their own engagement been discussed, considered and addressed?

- What are the key reference networks for social norms in the camp community to consult and engage with in order to seek support for social norms and gender-transformative programming? What are best entry points and strategies for engaging them?


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